Community as a Redistricting Principle: Consulting Media markets in Drawing District Lines by Miller, Jason C
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 86
Issue 5 The Supplement Article 1
2011
Community as a Redistricting Principle:




Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Election Law Commons, Law and Politics
Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miller, Jason C. (2011) "Community as a Redistricting Principle: Consulting Media markets in Drawing District Lines," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 86: Iss. 5, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol86/iss5/1
Community as a Redistricting Principle:  
Consulting Media Markets in Drawing District Lines 
JASON C. MILLER* 
Very soon, legislators, commissioners, and judges will begin battling over how 
to draw the lines for the next decade’s legislative districts. In trying to meet the 
federal legal requirements, line drawers will look at federal requirements like 
population equality1 and race;2 state requirements like protecting county and 
municipal lines,3 compactness,4 and contiguity;5 and practical political 
requirements like protecting incumbents6 and gerrymandering for partisan 
advantage.7 But hopefully, somewhere in the mix, there is room for common-sense 
goals like increasing voter participation and drawing districts that fit public 
expectations. To achieve these goals, legislative districts, both for Congress and the 
state house, should be drawn to reflect the actual communities that exist in that 
state. A city and its suburbs or nearby neighboring cities share an identity, culture, 
and economy that simply ought to be linked in the same district to the extent 
possible. Perhaps most importantly, communities often share the same media 
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 1.  Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983) (requiring “absolute equality” of 
population in congressional districts). 
 2.  See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1238 (2009) (deciding whether 
Voting Rights Act requires a district be drawn to help racial minority elect preferred 
candidate) (plurality opinion); see also Ellen D. Katz, From Laredo to Fort Worth: Race, 
Politics, and the Texas Redistricting Case, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 39 
(2006) (“[J]urisdictions must respect at least some existing racially-defined communities . . . 
.”). 
 3.  E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3.63(c) (2004) (requiring that the redistricting plan break 
as few county, city, and township boundaries as reasonably possible); IOWA CODE § 42.4(2) 
(2009) (“[D]istrict boundaries shall coincide with the boundaries of political subdivisions of 
the state.”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 (2004) (discussing protection of 
political subdivision lines). 
 4.  See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 14; IOWA CODE § 42.4(4) (2009); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 3.63(c) (2004). 
 5.  See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 14; IOWA CODE § 42.4(3) (2009); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 3.63(c) (2004). 
 6.  See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 300 (mentioning “the time-honored criterion of incumbent 
protection”). 
 7.  Bonnie Erbe, Democrats Must Keep Politics in 2010 Census; Gerrymander—and 
Gender-mander—Away!, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 3, 2009), 
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/erbe/2009/03/03/democrats-must-keep-politics-in-2010-
census-gerrymander--and-gender-mander--away.html (describing partisan gerrymandering 
as a uniquely American tradition, like Thanksgiving). 
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market. Two current congressional districts offer examples of lines that ignore 
these common-sense boundaries and unnecessarily split communities.8 
Michigan’s Seventh Congressional District grabs the suburbs of Lansing, where 
Michigan State University’s green and white colors dominate, and links them with 
Ann Arbor, home of its arch-rival University of Michigan.9 The district splits the 
Ann Arbor area in half, with lines drawn for partisan advantage rather than to 
reflect any common-sense approach. The rest of the district includes rural areas of 
southern Michigan. The distinctive communities in this district have nothing in 
common and the obvious community lines, apparent on any map or to anyone who 
lives in this district, are ignored. Furthermore, the district crosses four media 
markets—Detroit, Lansing, Toledo, and Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo/Battle Creek.10 
The major newspapers in the district must cover multiple members of Congress in 
any story about federal legislation; opponents wishing to criticize the incumbent on 
broadcast television or radio would spend inefficiently, as much of their advertising 
dollars would reach voters outside of the district.11 The reality of the district’s 
shape almost certainly influences campaign strategy, whether or not it ultimately 
drives up the cost.12 The lines respect city and most county borders, but do so by 
linking an odd series of counties and subdivisions at the expense of actual 
communities.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 8.  This problem, of course, is not limited to my two examples. “These gerrymandered 
districts often cover wide areas of territory, generally encompassing numerous communities 
and many different media markets.” Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the 
Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY 
L.J. 1519, 1557 (1994). 
 9.  CENTER FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY, MICHIGAN’S 15 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: 2001 APPORTIONMENT PLAN 
(2002), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/Congress01-state-E_43697_7.pdf. 
 10.  Fitzy, 7th District Media Markets – Part II, WALBERG WATCH (July 8, 2008, 6:02 
PM), http://walbergwatch.blogspot.com/2008_07_01_archive.html. 
 11.  As one court explained in a slightly different context, “the lack of congruence 
between media markets and district boundaries render [television] advertising an inefficient 
and ineffective way to communicate with voters.” Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 130 (2d 
Cir. 2004). Campaigns in such areas might turn to cable advertising as an alternative to 
broadcasting into other districts or states.  
 12.  See Shanto Iyengar, Daniel H. Lowenstein & Seth Masket, The Stealth Campaign: 
Experimental Studies of Slate Mail in California, 17 J.L. & POL. 295, 300 (2001) (“[F]or 
candidates running in districts much smaller than the media markets in which they are 
located, mail generally is the only economically feasible medium.”); see also Seth 
Grossman, Creating Competitive and Informative Campaigns: A Comprehensive Approach 
to “Free Air Time” for Political Candidates, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 383 (2004) 
(“Cable, on the other hand, enables candidates to more precisely channel their messages to 
individuals within their voting districts—to be more ‘geoefficient,’ in the jargon of cable-
television sales representatives. This quality of cable television is . . . important to . . . 
candidates who represent[] a district that is within a large media market or covers multiple 
media markets . . . .”). 
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Some districts do not even have the decency to respect city lines. Ohio’s 
Thirteenth Congressional District cuts a jagged, diagonal line from Lake Erie 
across the Cleveland suburbs and down into Akron. Summit County, with Akron as 
its county seat, is carved into three jagged districts that divide individual 
neighborhoods. Akron’s eastern suburbs are in a district dominated by Youngstown 
to the east. Of course, drawing districts with equal population requires some 
bending of community and local government lines to even out the population, but 
the greater Akron area is large enough to fill its own congressional district.13 There 
are numerous advantages to putting a community like Akron into a single 
congressional district. 
When a congressional district covers a single media market, or at least does not 
snake across several, it makes it easier for the media to track and report on the 
representative and his or her actions. This in turn makes it easier for the public to 
identify their elected official and that official’s actions. And a single media market 
also makes it easier to publicly oppose or challenge a representative’s policies 
through letters to the editor, paid media, or “earned media” generated through 
demonstrations.14 This might help to explain the link between media markets and 
voter turnout, as the evidence indicates that people who live in districts drawn 
around media market lines—and not necessarily political subdivision lines—are 
more likely to vote.15 This is likely the result of voters being more informed about 
the candidates.16 The data shows that “[t]he more a district conforms to its media 
environment, the more likely it is that citizens are able to recall the names of 
candidates running for office in that district.”17 The increased information costs and 
difficulty in learning about candidates when districts do not conform to media 
markets stifle participation.18 Furthermore, disrupting media markets might 
particularly burden minority voter turnout.19  
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 13.  In 2000 the average size of a congressional district was 646,952. Congressional 
Apportionment, NATIONALATLAS.GOV, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/boundaries/a_ 
conApport.html#two. The Akron metro area had a population of 694,960 in 2000. Akron, 
OH MSA Population and Components of Change, REAL ESTATE CTR., 
http://recenter.tamu.edu/data/popm/pm0080.htm. 
 14.  “Earned media” is a common political phrase for free media, as contrasted with 
paid media such as advertisements. Examples include op-eds and news coverage. See use of 
the phrase in Manu Raju, Jonathan Martin & John Bresnahan, Finger-Pointing Begins for 
Dems, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2010, 12:29 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=44 
530A92-18FE-70B2-A84AAC11926FC1EE. 
 15.  Richard N. Engstrom, District Geography and Voters, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 65, 77 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (“[P]eople who live in districts with 
greater levels of conformity to media markets are more likely to turn out to vote than those 
in districts with lower levels of conformity to media-market boundaries.”). 
 16.  Id. at 78. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 77–78. 
 19.  Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, Strength in Numbers: Group Size and 
Political Mobilization, 48 J.L. & ECON. 73, 74 (2005). 
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More name identification, an easier time identifying the official’s votes on key 
issues, and higher voter turnout create the possibility for greater accountability. It is 
harder to get voters involved and active in the political process if they cannot figure 
out who their representative is—people often have trouble understanding that they 
can live in the same town and have different representatives, or why the U.S. House 
website requires them to use their ZIP+4 to email their member of Congress. Many 
grassroots political organizations are created based on the community, not the 
artificial district lines.20 Anti-war groups organize in Ann Arbor, but find their 
community split in two. Pro-life groups in the greater Akron area have to help their 
members identify their member of Congress before encouraging them to express 
their opinion.21 As Judge Jones explained: 
Traditional, objective districting criteria are a concomitant part of truly 
“representative” single member districting plans. Organized political 
activity takes place most effectively within neighborhoods and 
communities; on a larger scale, these organizing units may evolve into 
media markets and geographic regions. When natural geographic and 
political boundaries are arbitrarily cut, the influence of local 
organizations is seriously diminished. After the civic and veterans 
groups, labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious congregations, 
and school boards are subdivided among districts, they can no longer 
importune their Congressman and expect to wield the same degree of 
influence that they would if all their members were voters in his 
district. Similarly, local groups are disadvantaged from effectively 
organizing in an election campaign because their numbers, money, and 
neighborhoods are split. Another casualty of abandoning traditional 
districting principles is likely to be voter participation in the electoral 
process. A citizen will be discouraged from undertaking grass-roots 
activity if, for instance, she has attempted to distribute leaflets in her 
congressman's district only to find that she could not locate its 
boundaries.22 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 20.  That a district’s shape can interfere with normal organizing seems obvious. See 
Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 n.4 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (“Interference with normal 
organizing and campaigning activities could be expected to be particularly acute in this 
district, which spans the state’s three largest media markets and stretches over 160 miles.”). 
 21.  See Engstrom, supra note 15, at 67 (“[N]ot knowing where a district takes an 
unexpected right turn means not knowing who in the immediate area is, and is not, in the 
district. This confusion about district boundaries can lead to confusion about which 
legislative race to pay attention to and who among one’s neighbors is also in the relevant 
district.”). 
 22.  Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1334 n.43 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (three-judge 
panel) (invalidating a redistricting plan) (emphasis in original). 
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Sprawling, irregularly shaped districts may have competing interests and lack a 
sense of community.23 Districts drawn around publicly understood communities 
should be easier to represent. When people live and work in the same district, rather 
than crossing a district line in a short commute, their economic interests might be 
easier to understand and stand up for. Even political party leaders might find 
advantages in having districts drawn up around communities. Party leaders are 
often faced with the difficult task of recruiting candidates to run against incumbents 
in “safe” districts. These sacrificial lambs may have no chance of winning, but they 
offer voters a choice and play a vital, but threatened, role in our democracy.24 
When district lines make little sense, instead of simply seeking out willing party 
activists or community leaders, party hacks must get out their maps and investigate 
which precinct their candidate hopefuls live in. Diagonal districts that do not reflect 
community lines and that zigzag through media markets could make it harder and 
more costly for a challenger to get her message out,25 adding difficulty to the 
candidate recruitment process. And, at the very least, community boundaries are a 
much more legitimate basis than the partisanship or incumbent protection that 
motivates most redistricting. 
The problems with considering community as a redistricting principle are easy 
to overcome if the line drawers desire to do so.26 While the equal-population 
requirement necessarily forces communities to be broken if they do not fit the exact 
number required of equivalent congressional districts, line drawers can make at 
least some effort to mitigate this when possible. And when it is possible to draw an 
entire district around a single and distinct community—such as the Akron 
metropolitan area—they should. Defining communities presents its own difficulty 
because “community” is a nebulous and somewhat subjective term. But a little bit 
of common sense can go a long way in this regard, as most informed people have 
some idea of how the metropolitan areas in their state think of themselves.  
Moreover, media markets might be a useful starting tool, as they offer a clear 
identification of the boundaries of a community.27 Media markets are important for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 23. See DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1086 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (“This long, 
irregularly shaped district traverses parts of seventeen counties and involves three major 
media markets. The communities linked in this sprawling district are likely to have 
competing interests and do not constitute communities of interest.”). 
 24.  For a discussion on the shortage of candidates, see Jason C. Miller, The Unwise and 
Unconstitutional Hatch Act: Why State and Local Government Employees Should Be Free to 
Run for Public Office, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313 (2010). 
 25.  See Engstrom, supra note 15, at 82–83 (“Cleaner district-media market 
relationships should make it easier for challengers to get their names out to potential voters, 
therefore increasing their chances of defeating incumbents.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Daggett v. Kimmelman, Nos. 82-297, 82-388, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1296, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 1988) (noting that line drawer had made “reference to media 
markets” in fashioning district). 
 27.  Sometimes communities and their media markets straddle state lines, and in such 
cases districts will obviously have to split them. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith & Jason Robert 
Owen, Boundary-Based Restrictions in Boundless Broadcast Media Markets: McConnell v. 
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two reasons. First, they are important as actual media markets—a concentration of 
people consuming the same newspapers and television and radio stations—because 
the ease of gathering and disseminating information about candidates increases 
voter turnout. Second, media markets are important as indicia of practical 
community boundaries, driven in part by market forces and a spontaneous-order 
process. Even if the importance of traditional broadcast media outlets is waning, 
local-focused new media, such as local and regional political blogs, seem to 
continue to fit the old media market lines. Media market boundaries are probably 
most important for congressional districts because of their size—many state 
legislative districts might naturally conform to media markets—but in all cases 
districts should conform to media markets to the extent reasonable under the 
circumstances.  
The location of actual communities, whether analyzed through defined media 
markets or more complex formulations that look at additional boundaries (such as 
school districts), should be among the criteria line drawers consider during 
redistricting. Community boundaries as defined by media markets should not be the 
only criteria for courts to base a decision on, but should be included among the 
many factors examined when forced to decide among competing plans.28 More 
scholarship is needed to examine the significance of media markets to 
redistricting,29 but there are good reasons to include common sense community 
considerations in any push for redistricting reform or discussion of the optimal way 
to create districts. 
                                                                                                                 
 
FEC’s Underinclusive Overbreadth Analysis, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 240, 253 (2007) 
(“The Cincinnati media market covers southwestern Ohio and parts of Indiana and northern 
Kentucky.”). But in most circumstances, media markets will offer a helpful starting point for 
identifying community lines. 
 28.  A few courts have already looked at media markets in deciding redistricting cases. 
See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 502 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (discussing media 
markets); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (noting that one of the 
reasons the state rejected a proposed districting plan was that “a candidate to be successful 
will have to run in four major media markets in Georgia”); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 
472 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (noting that both parties submitted evidence of media markets in a 
redistricting case); Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684, 691 
(D. Ariz. 1992) (considering media markets in choosing among redistricting plans). 
 29.  See Engstrom, supra note 15, at 82 (noting that media markets are “rarely discussed 
in analyses of redistricting questions”). 
